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Abstract—Although distribution grid customers are obliged to
share their consumption data with distribution system operators
(DSOs), a possible leakage of this data is often disregarded in
operational routines of DSOs. This paper introduces a privacy-
preserving optimal power flow (OPF) mechanism for distribution
grids that secures customer privacy from unauthorised access
to OPF solutions, e.g., current and voltage measurements. The
mechanism is based on the framework of differential privacy
that allows to control the participation risks of individuals
in a dataset by applying a carefully calibrated noise to the
output of a computation. Unlike existing private mechanisms,
this mechanism does not apply the noise to the optimization
parameters or its result. Instead, it optimizes OPF variables
as affine functions of the random noise, which weakens the
correlation between the grid loads and OPF variables. To ensure
feasibility of the randomized OPF solution, the mechanism makes
use of chance constraints enforced on the grid limits. The
mechanism is further extended to control the optimality loss
induced by the random noise, as well as the variance of OPF
variables. The paper shows that the differentially private OPF
solution does not leak customer loads up to specified parameters.
Index Terms—Data obfuscation, optimization methods, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
THE increasing observability of distribution grids enablesadvanced operational practices for distribution system
operators (DSOs). In particular, high-resolution voltage and
current measurements available to DSOs allow for continu-
ously steering the system operation towards an optimal power
flow (OPF) solution [1]–[3]. However, when collected, these
measurements expose distribution grid customers to privacy
breaches. Several studies have shown that the measurements of
OPF variables can be used by an adversary to identify the type
of appliances and load patterns of grid customers [4], [5]. The
public response to these privacy risks has been demonstrated
by the Dutch Parliament’s decision to thwart the deployment
of smart meters until the privacy concerns are resolved [6].
Although grid customers tend to entrust DSOs with their
data in exchange for a reliable supply, their privacy rights are
often disregarded in operational routines of DSOs. To resolve
this issue, this paper augments the OPF computations with the
preservation of customer privacy in the following sense.
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Definition 1 (Customer privacy). The right of grid customers
to be secured from an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
information that can be inferred from the OPF solution.
To ensure this right, privacy needs to be rigorously quanti-
fied and guaranteed. Differential privacy (DP) [7] is a strong
privacy notion that quantifies and bounds privacy risks in
computations involving sensitive datasets. By augmenting the
computations with a carefully calibrated random noise, a DP
mechanism guarantees that the noisy results do not disclose
the attributes of individual items in a dataset. Chaudhuri et al.
[8] and Hsu et al. [9] introduced several mechanisms to solve
optimization models while preventing the recovery of the input
data from optimization results. These mechanisms apply noise
to either the parameters or the results of an optimization. The
applied noise, however, fundamentally alters the optimization
problem of interest. Therefore, the direct application of these
mechanisms to OPF problems has been limited. First, they may
fail to provide a feasible solution for constrained optimization
problems. To restore feasibility, they require an additional level
of complexity such as the post-processing steps proposed in
[10], [11]. Second, although these mechanisms provide bounds
on the worst-case performance, they do not consider the
optimality loss as a control variable. As a result, they cannot
provide appropriate trade-offs between the expected and the
worst-case mechanism performances. Finally, the previously
proposed mechanisms overlook the impact of the noise on
the variance of the optimization results. Hence, their direct
application to OPF problems may lead to undesired overloads
of system components [12].
Contributions: To overcome these limitations, this paper
proposes a novel differentially private OPF mechanism that
does not add the noise to the optimization parameters or to the
results. Instead, it obtains DP by optimizing OPF variables as
affine functions of the noise, bypassing the above-mentioned
theoretical drawbacks. More precisely, the paper makes the
following contributions:
1. The proposed mechanism produces a random OPF so-
lution that follows a Normal distribution and guarantees
(ε, δ)−differential privacy [7]. Parameters ε and δ, respec-
tively, bound the multiplicative and additive differences
between the probability distributions of OPF solutions
obtained on adjacent datasets (i.e., differing in at most
one load value). The mechanism is particularly suitable
for protecting grid loads from unauthorized access to OPF
solutions, as fine-tuned (ε, δ) values make randomized OPF
solutions similar, irrespective of the used load dataset.
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22. The mechanism enforces chance constraints on random
OPF variables to guarantee solution feasibility for a given
constraint satisfaction probability. This way, it does not
require a post-processing step to restore OPF feasibility, as
in [10] and [11]. Since the OPF variables are affine in the
Gaussian noise, the chance constraints are reformulated into
computationally efficient second-order cone constraints.
3. The mechanism enables the control of random OPF out-
comes without weakening the DP guarantees. Using results
from stochastic programming [13], the optimality loss
induced by the noise is controlled using Conditional Value-
at-Risk (CVaR) risk measure, enabling a trade-off between
the expected and the worst-case performance. Furthermore,
with a variance-aware control from [14], the mechanism
attains DP with a smaller variance of OPF variables.
Broader Impact: Distribution OPF proposals have been
around for at least a decade, though their adoption in real op-
erations is complicated by the need of utilizing load datasets,
which raises significant privacy concerns by many regulators
worldwide. The adoption of the proposed mechanism, in turn,
extends standard OPF models to enable a privacy-cognizant
utilization1 of this data, thus facilitating the digitization of
the energy sector. The mechanism treats the DSOs as trust-
worthy parties and places them on the same ground with the
digital service providers, e.g. Amazon, enabling the regulation
and securing legal responsibility of the digitalized distribution
grids under modern data protection and privacy standards,
including the General Data Protection Rights (GDPR) in the
European Union, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)
and the New York Privacy Act (NYPA) in the United States.
Moreover, the mechanism provides the means to hedge the
financial risks of the DSOs by avoiding the cost incurred by
privacy violations, such as legal costs, as it relies on a strong
quantification of privacy and co-optimizes the joint cost of
energy supply and privacy.
Related Work: Thanks to its strong privacy guarantees, DP
has been recently applied to private OPF computations. In
particular, the mechanism of Zhou et al. [15] releases aggre-
gated OPF statistics, e.g., aggregated load, while ensuring the
privacy for individual loads, even if all but one loads are com-
promised. The proposals by Fioretto et al. [10] and Mak et al.
[11] provide a differentially private mechanism to release high-
fidelity OPF datasets (e.g., load and network parameters) from
real power systems while minimizing the risks of disclosing
the actual system parameters. The mechanisms, however, are
meant for the private release of aggregate statistics and input
datasets and do not provide the OPF solution itself.
Private OPF computations have also been studied in a
decentralized and distributed setting. Dvorkin et al. [16]
designed a distributed OPF algorithm with a differentially
private exchange of coordination signals, hence preventing
the leakage of the sensitive information contained in the
algorithm subproblems. Han et al. [17] proposed a privacy-
aware distributed coordination scheme for electrical vehicle
charging. The privacy frameworks in [16] and [17], however,
1Note that privacy concerns a safe utilization of the data, not its storage,
which falls within the field of cyber-security.
are not suitable for centralized computations and solely focus
on the privacy leakage through the exchange of coordination
signals. Moreover, to negate the privacy loss induced at every
iteration, they require scaling the parameters of the random
perturbation, thus involving larger optimality losses and poorer
convergence. The centralized mechanisms proposed in this
work, however, allow obtaining the private OPF solution in
a single computation run. In distribution systems, Zhang et
al. [18], among other proposals reviewed in [6], designed a
privacy-aware optimization of behind-the-meter energy storage
systems to prevent the leakage of consumption data from the
smart meter readings. However, they disregard OPF feasibility
of distribution systems, which has to be preserved in all
circumstances.
Paper Organization: Following the preliminaries in Section
II, Section III formalizes the privacy goals and provides an
overview of the proposed solution. Section IV provides the for-
mulation of the proposed privacy-preserving OPF mechanism
and its properties, whereas Section V presents its extensions.
Section VI provides numerical experiments and Section VII
concludes. The proofs are relegated to the appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Optimal Power Flow Problem
The paper considers a low-voltage radial distribution grid
with controllable distributed energy resources (DERs). A DSO
is responsible for controlling the DERs and supplying power
from the high-voltage grid while meeting the technical limits
of the grid. The grid is modeled as a graph Γ (N,L), where
N = {0, 1, . . . , n} is the set of nodes and L = N \ {0} is the
set of lines connecting those nodes. The root node, indexed
by 0, is a substation with a large capacity and fixed voltage
magnitude v0 = 1. The radial topology, depicted in Fig. 1,
associates each node i ∈ N with the sets Ui and Di of,
respectively, upstream and downstream nodes, as well as with
the set Ri of nodes on the path to the root node.
Each node i is characterized by its fixed active dpi and
reactive dqi power load and by its voltage magnitude vi ∈
[vi, vi]. For modeling convenience, the voltage variables are
substituted by ui = v2i , ∀i ∈ N. A controllable DER sited at
node i outputs an amount of active gpi ∈ [gpi , g
p
i ] and reactive
gqi ∈ [gqi , g
q
i ] power. Its costs are linear with a cost coefficient
ci. To model the relation between the active and reactive DER
power output, the constant power factor tanφi is assumed for
each node i. The active and reactive power flows, fp` and f
q
` ,
∀` ∈ L, respectively, are constrained by the apparent power
limit f `, and each line is characterized by its resistance r` and
reactance x`. The deterministic OPF model is formulated as:
D-OPF : min
g†,f†,u
∑
i∈N
cig
p
i (1a)
s.t. g†0 =
∑
i∈D0
(d†i − g†i ), u0 = 1, (1b)
f†` = d
†
` − g†` +
∑
i∈D`
(d†i − g†i ), ∀` ∈ L, (1c)
ui = u0 − 2
∑
`∈Ri
(fp` r` + f
q
` x`), ∀i ∈ L, (1d)
(fp` )
2 + (fq` )
2 6 f2` , ∀` ∈ L, (1e)
3
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Gaussian noise, the chance constraints are reformulated into
computationally efficient second-order cone constraints.
3. The mechanism enables the control of random OPF out-
comes without weakening the DP guarantees. Using results
from stochastic programming [13], the optimality loss in-
duced by the noise is controlled using Conditional Value-at-
Risk (CVaR) risk measure, enabling the trade-off between
the expected and the worst-case performance. Furthermore,
with a variance-aware control from [14], the mechanism
attains DP with a smaller variance of OPF variables.
Related Work: Thanks to its strong privacy guarantees, DP
has been recently applied to private OPF computations. In
particular, the mechanism of Zhou et al. [15] releases aggre-
gated OPF statistics, e.g., aggregated load, while ensuring the
privacy for individual loads, even if all but one loads are com-
promised. The proposals by Fioretto et al. [10] and Mak et al.
[11] provide a differentially private mechanism to release high-
fidelity OPF datasets (e.g., load and network parameters) from
real power systems while minimizing the risks of disclosing
the actual system parameters. The mechanisms, however, are
meant for the private release of aggregate statistics and input
datasets and do not provide the OPF solution itself.
Private OPF computations have also been studied in a
decentralized setting. Dvorkin et al. [16] designed a distributed
OPF algorithm with a differentially private exchange of co-
ordination signals, hence preventing the leakage of sensitive
information in the algorithm subproblems. Han et al. [17]
proposed a privacy-aware distributed coordination scheme for
electrical vehicle charging. The privacy frameworks in [16]
and [17], however, are not suitable for centralized compu-
tations. In distribution systems, Zhang et al. [18], among
other proposals reviewed in [6], designed a privacy-aware
optimization of behind-the-meter energy storage systems to
prevent the leakage of consumption data from the smart meter
readings. However, they disregard OPF feasibility of distribu-
tion systems, which has to be preserved in all circumstances.
Paper Organization: Following the preliminaries in Section
II, Section III formalizes the privacy goals and provides an
overview of the proposed solution. Section IV provides the
formulation of the proposed privacy-preserving OPF mecha-
nism, whereas Section V presents its properties and extensions.
Finally, Section VI provides numerical experiments.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Optimal Power Flow Problem
The paper considers a low-voltage radial distribution grid
with controllable distributed energy resources (DERs). A DSO
is responsible for controlling the DERs and supplying power
from the high-voltage grid while meeting the technical limits
of the grid. The grid is modeled as a graph   (N,L), where
N = {0, 1, . . . , n} is the set of nodes and L = N \ {0} is the
set of lines connecting those nodes. The root node, indexed
by 0, is a substation with a large capacity and fixed voltage
magnitude v0 = 1. The radial topology, depicted in Fig. 1,
associates each node i 2 N with the sets Ui and Di of,
respectively, upstream and downstream nodes, as well as with
the set Ri of nodes on the path to the root node.
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Fig. 1. Topology of the distribution grid relative to node i, † = {p, q}.
Each node i is characterized by its fixed active dpi and
reactive dqi power load and by its voltage magnitude vi 2
[vi, vi]. For modeling convenience, the voltage variables are
substituted by ui = v2i , 8i 2 N. A controllable DER sited at
node i outputs an amount of active gpi 2 [gpi , g
p
i ] and reactive
gqi 2 [gqi , g
q
i ] power. Its costs are linear with a cost coefficient
ci. To model the relation between active and reactive power
output, the paper assumes a constant power factor tan i.
Similarly, the constant power factor is assumed for loads,
such that each load i can be described solely by its active
component dpi . The active and reactive power flows, f
p
` and f
q
` ,
8` 2 L, respectively, are constrained by the apparent power
limit f `, and each line is characterized by its resistance r` and
reactance x`. The deterministic OPF model is formulated as:
D-OPF : min
g†,f†,u
P
i2N
cig
p
i (1a)
s.t. g†0 =
P
i2D0
(d†i   g†i ), u0 = 1, (1b)
f†` = d
†
`   g†` +
P
i2D`
(d†i   g†i ), 8` 2 L, (1c)
ui = u0   2
P
`2Ri
(fp` r` + f
q
` x`), 8i 2 N \ {0},
(1d)
(fp` )
2 + (fq` )
2 6 f2` , 8` 2 L, (1e)
g†
i
6 g†i 6 g
†
i , 8i 2 N, (1f)
v2i 6 ui 6 v2i , 8i 2 N \ {0}, (1g)
where superscript † = {p, q} indexes active and reactive
power. The objective is to minimize the total operational
cost subject to the OPF equations (1b)–(1d) and grid limits
(1e)–(1g). The OPF equations balance the grid based on the
LinDistFlow AC power flow equations [19].
B. Differential Privacy
The paper uses the framework of differential privacy [7]
to quantify and control the privacy risks of the customer
loads. It considers datasets D 2 Rn as n-dimensional vectors
describing the active load values, denoted by di for each node
i. To protect the participation of the load in the ith entry of
the dataset, the following adjacency relation is introduced:
D ⇠  D0 , 9i s.t. |di   d0i| 6  i ^ dj = d0j , 8j 6= i,
where D and D0 are two adjacent datasets,   2 Rn is a vector
of positive real values, and the values di and d0i are the load
values corresponding to customer i in D and D0, respectively.
Fig. 1. Topology of the distribution grid relative to node i, † = {p, q}.
g†
i
6 g†i 6 g
†
i , ∀i ∈ N, (1f)
v2i 6 ui 6 v2i , ∀i ∈ N \ {0}, (1g)
where superscript † = {p, q} indexes active and reactive
power. The objective is to minimize the total perational
cost subject to the OPF equations (1b)–(1d), that balance
the grid based on the LinDistFlow AC power flow equations
[19, equations (9)] for distribution grids, and grid limits (1e)–
(1g). Equation (1b) requires the total mismatch between power
generation and loads in the distribution grid to be compensated
for by the power from the substation at the root node. Equation
(1c) requires the balance between the power flow along every
edge `, power mismatch at the in-flow node ` as well as
that at the downstream nodes. The last term in (1c) can be
also rewritten as the sum of power flows in the adjacent
downstream lines, but kept as it is in the interest of the
subsequent derivations. Last, equation (1d) models the voltage
drop along the path from the root node to the node of interest.
Although OPF equations 1b)-(1d) establish the affine re-
lation between the OPF variables, which is necessary for
the subsequent chance-constrained formulation, they neglect
distribution grid losses. The losses, however, can be included
in an affine manner using various linearization techniques,
such as in [20], [21] and [22] to mention but a few examples.
B. Differential Privacy
The paper uses the framework of differential privacy [7]
to quantify and control the privacy risks of the customer
loads. It considers datasets D ∈ Rn as n-dimensional vectors
describing the active load values, denoted by di for each node
i. To protect the participation of the load in the ith entry of
the dataset, the following adjacency relation is introduced:
D ∼β D′ ⇔ ∃i s.t. |di − d′i| 6 βi a d dj = d′j ,∀j 6= i,
where D and D′ are two djacent datasets, β ∈ Rn is a vector
of positive real values, and values di and d′i are the load values
corresponding to customer i in D and D′, respectively. The
adjacency relates two load vectors that differ in at most one
item, at position i, by a value not greater than βi.
If a mechanism satisfies the definition of differential privacy,
it returns similar results on adjacent datasets in a probabilistic
sense. This intuition is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy). Given a value β ∈ Rn+, a
randomized mechanism M˜ :D→R with domain D and range
R is (ε, δ)-differential private if, for any output s ⊆ R and
any two adjacent inputs D ∼β D′ ∈ Rn
P[M˜(D) ∈ s] 6 eεP[M˜(D′) ∈ s] + δ,
where P denotes the probability over runs of M˜.
In the context of OPF problem (1), domain D includes
all feasible load datasets, mechanism M denotes the OPF
problem itself, and M˜ is its randomized counterpart, and range
R denotes the feasible region of the OPF problem.
The level of privacy is controlled by DP parameters (ε, δ).
The former corresponds to the maximal multiplicative differ-
ence in distributions obtained by the mechanism on adjacent
datasets, whereas the latter defines the maximal additive
difference. Consequently, smaller values of ε and δ provide
stronger privacy protection. Definition 2 extends the metric-
based differential privacy introduced by Chatzikokolakis et al.
[23] to control of individual privacy risks.
If a mechanism satisfies Definition 2, it features two impor-
tant properties. First, by acting on adjacent datasets D and D′,
it provides privacy for each item i irrespective of the properties
of all remaining items in a dataset. Second, it is immune to the
so-called side attacks, i.e., it ensures that even if an attacker
acquires the data of all other users but i, when accessing the
output M˜(D) of the differential private mechanism, it will
not be able to infer the load value of user i up to differential
privacy bounds ε and δ [24].
The differentially private design of any mechanism is
obtained by means of randomization using, among others,
Laplace or Gaussian noise for numerical queries and expo-
nential noise for the so-called non-numerical events [24]. The
DP requirements for an optimization problem are achieved
by introducing a calibrated noise to the input data [9] or to
the output or objective function of the mechanism itself [8].
Regardless of the strategy adopted to attain DP, the amount
of noise to inject depends on the mechanism sensitivity. In
particular, the L2−sensitivity of a deterministic mechanism
M on β-adjacent datasets, denoted by ∆β , is defined as:
∆β = max
D∼βD′
‖M(D)−M(D′)‖2 .
This work employs the Gaussian mechanism, because the
Gaussian noise allows for the exact analytic reformulation of
chance constraints into tractable second-order cone constraints.
Theorem 1 (Gaussian mechanism [24]). Let M be a mech-
anism of interest that maps datasets D to Rn, and let ∆β be
its L2−sensitivity. For ε ∈ (0, 1) and γ2 > 2 ln( 1.25δ ), the
Gaussian mechanism that outputs M˜(D) =M(D) + ξ, with
ξ noise drawn from the Normal distribution with 0 mean and
standard deviation σ > γ∆βε is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
When the DP mechanism produces solutions to an opti-
mization problem, it is also important to quantify the opti-
mality loss, i.e., the distance between the optimal solutions of
the original mechanism M(D) and its differentially private
counterpart M˜(D) evaluated on the original dataset D.
43
The adjacency relation relates two load vectors that differ in
at most one item, at position i, by a value not greater than  i.
If a mechanism satisfies the definition of differential privacy,
it returns similar results on adjacent datasets in a probabilistic
sense. This intuition is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy). Given a value   2 Rn+, a
randomized mechanism M˜ :D!R with domain D and range
R is (",  )-differential private if, for any output s ✓ R and
any two adjacent inputs D ⇠  D0 2 Rn
P[M˜(D) 2 s] 6 e"P[M˜(D0) 2 s] +  ,
where P denotes the probability over runs of M˜.
The level of privacy is controlled by DP parameters (",  ).
The former corresponds to the maximal multiplicative differ-
ence in distributions obtained by the mechanism on adjacent
datasets, whereas the latter defines the maximal additive
difference. Consequently, smaller values of " and   provide
stronger privacy protection. Definition 2 extends the metric-
based differential privacy introduced by Chatzikokolakis et al.
[20] to control of individual privacy risks.
The differentially private design of any mechanism is
obtained by means of randomization using, among others,
Laplace, Gaussian, or exponential noise [21]. The DP require-
ments for an optimization problem are achieved by introducing
a calibrated noise to the input data [9] or to the output or
objective function of the mechanism itself [8]. Regardless of
the strategy adopted to attain DP, the amount of noise to
inject depends on the mechanism sensitivity. In particular, the
L2 sensitivity of a deterministic mechanismM on  -adjacent
datasets, denoted by    , is defined as:
   = max
D⇠ D0
kM(D) M(D0)k2 .
This work makes use of the Gaussian mechanism, which
provides (",  ) differential privacy as per the following result.
Theorem 1 (Gaussian mechanism [21]). Let M be a mech-
anism of interest that maps datasets D to Rn. For " 2 (0, 1)
and  2 > 2 ln( 1.25  ), the Gaussian mechanism that outputs
M˜(D) = M(D) + ⇠, with ⇠ noise drawn from the Normal
distribution with 0 mean and standard deviation   >    " is
(",  )-differentially private.
When the DP mechanism produces solutions to an opti-
mization problem, it is also important to quantify the opti-
mality loss, i.e., the distance between the optimal solutions of
the original mechanism M(D) and its differentially private
counterpart M˜(D) evaluated on the original dataset D.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the context of the underlying dispatch problem, the DSO
collects a dataset D = {dpi }i2N of customer sensitive loads
and dispatches the DER according to the solution of the OPF
model (1). The OPF model acts as a mechanism M : D 7! s
that maps the dataset D into an optimal OPF solution s?. The
solution is a tuple comprising generator set points {gpi , gqi }i2N,
power flows {fp` , fq` }`2L, and voltages {ui}i2N, as depicted
on the left plane in Fig. 2. However, the release of s? poses
⇥
S
￿
s?
○
s˜
operating cost
s
P[s˜ 2 S]
P[s˜ /2 S]
probability density
Fig. 2. Projections of OPF solutions onto operating cost and feasibility space.
a privacy threat: an adversary with access to the items in s?
could decode the customers activities [4], [5]. For instance,
the voltage sags at a node of interest discloses the activity
of residential costumers (e.g., charging an electrical vehicle).
Voltages and flows (currents) also encode information about
the technology, production patterns, and other commercial data
of industrial customers [10].
To minimize privacy risks, this work proposes a mechanism
M˜ for the DSO, which returns a feasible solution s˜ at the
expense of an optimality loss, as shown in Fig. 2. A non-trivial
benefit of choosing s˜ over s? is that the former includes a
particular perturbation of the optimal solution and thus carries
less information about the real load data D. For instance, the
sub-optimal solution can feature a more intensive deployment
of the DERs to compensate for the voltage sags instead of
purchasing power from the high-voltage grid. To ensure that
M˜ returns a differentially private solution, s˜ has to follow
a carefully calibrated noise distribution, as depicted on the
right plane in Fig. 2. In other words, the mechanism must
satisfy Definition 2, i.e., on adjacent load datasets, it must
output distributions (describing the generator outputs, flows,
and voltages) that differ by at most " and   in multiplicative
and additive terms, respectively. However, with smaller " and
 , the variance of the OPF solutions and hence the probability
of producing an infeasible solution increases. The mechanism
thus needs to address this feasibility issue. Finally, the last
desired property is the ability to control the induced optimality
loss ⇥ in order to ensure cost-effective grid operations.
IV. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE OPF MECHANISM
This section provides a mathematical description of mech-
anism M˜ and details its application. The intuition behind the
mechanism is as follows. Consider an optimal OPF solution s?.
The DP mechanism could perturb the optimal power flows in
s? with random noise ⇠ and then adapt the optimal generation
schedule and voltages to match the perturbed power flows.
However, there is no guarantee that this will result in a feasible
dispatch. To remedy this limitation, the mechanism does not
use s?, but instead solves a chance-constrained optimization
that produces an OPF solution s˜?, which is robust to flow
perturbations, i.e., with high probability, it is possible to find
a feasible generator dispatch and its associated voltages for
any calibrated noise injection on the power flow. Once s˜?
is obtained, the mechanism perturbs the power flows in s˜?
Fig. 2. Projections of OPF solutions onto operating cost and feasibility space.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the context of the underlying dispatch problem, the DSO
collects a dataset D = {dpi }i∈N of customer sensitive loads
and dispatches the DER according to the solution of the OPF
model (1). The OPF model acts as a mechanism M : D 7→ s
that maps the dataset D into an optimal OPF solution s?. The
solution is a tuple comprising generator set points {gpi , gqi }i∈N,
power flows {fp` , fq` }`∈L, and voltages {ui}i∈N, as depicted
on the left plane in Fig. 2. However, the release of s? poses
a privacy threat: an adversary with access to the items in s?
could decode the customers activities [4], [5]. For instance,
the voltage sags at a node of interest discloses the activity
of residential costumers (e.g., charging an electrical vehicle).
Voltages and flows (currents) also encode information about
the technology, production patterns, and other commercial data
of industrial customers [10].
To minimize privacy risks, this work proposes a mechanism
M˜ for the DSO, which returns a feasible solution s˜ at
the expense of an optimality loss, as shown in Fig. 2. A
non-trivial benefit of choosing s˜ over s? is that the former
includes a particular perturbation of the optimal solution and
thus carries less information about the real load data D. For
instance, the sub-optimal solution can feature a more intensive
deployment of expensive DERs instead of purchasing less
expensive power from the high-voltage grid. To ensure that
M˜ returns a differentially private solution, s˜ has to follow a
carefully calibrated noise distribution, as depicted on the right
plane in Fig. 2. In other words, the mechanism must satisfy
Definition 2, i.e., on adjacent load datasets, it must output
distributions that differ by at most ε and δ in multiplicative
and additive terms, respectively. However, with smaller ε and
δ, the variance of the OPF solutions and hence the probability
of producing an infeasible solution increases. The mechanism
thus needs to address this feasibility issue. Finally, the last
desired property is the ability to control the induced optimality
loss Θ in order to ensure cost-effective grid operations.
To provide differentially private OPF solutions, the work
focuses on the randomization of active power flows as their
sensitivities to grid loads can be directly upper-bounded by the
load magnitudes in radial grids. Since the OPF equations (1b)–
(1d) couple OPF variables, the randomization of power flows
will also induce the randomization of reactive power flows
and voltages. Therefore, the randomized OPF mechanism M˜
is now seen as a mapping from a dataset D to the active power
flow solution fp. Let F p ∈ R|L| be a particular realization of
the randomized active power flows. The privacy goal of this
work is to ensure that M˜ satisfies
D ∼β D′ : P[M˜(D) ∈ F p] 6 eεP[M˜(D′) ∈ F p] + δ, i.e.,
the definition of (ε, δ)−DP on β−adjacent load datasets.
IV. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE OPF MECHANISM
This section provides a mathematical description of mecha-
nism M˜ and details its application. Section IV-A describes the
perturbation of generator outputs to attain the randomization
of power flows, Section IV-B details the chance-constrained
program that accommodates the perturbation in a feasible
manner, and Section IV-C explains the mechanism application
as well as its feasibility and privacy guarantees.
A. Random Perturbation of OPF Solutions
Consider a random perturbation ξ ∈ R|L| which obeys a
Gaussian distribution N (0,Σ) with covariance matrix
Σ = diag([σ21 , . . . , σ
2
|L|]) = diag(σ
2) ∈ R|L|×|L|.
Throughout the paper, Σ, σ2, and σ are used interchangeably
to discuss the perturbation parameters. The power flows are
conditioned on perturbation ξ when the following affine poli-
cies are imposed on DERs and substation supplies:
g˜pi (ξ) = g
p
i +
∑
`∈Di
αi`ξ` −
∑
`∈Ui
αi`ξ`, ∀i ∈ N, (2a)
where g˜pi (ξ) and g
p
i are, respectively, the random and nominal
(mean) active power outputs, and αi` is the portion of random
perturbation ξ` provided by the supplier at node i, modeled
as a free variable. The policies in (2a) are viable when the
following balancing conditions are enforced:∑
i∈U`
αi` = 1,
∑
i∈D`
αi` = 1, ∀` ∈ L, (2b)
such that for each line `, the upstream suppliers adjust their
aggregated output by ξ` and the downstream DERs counter-
balance this perturbation by ξ`, thus satisfying power balance.
The policies in (2) differ from those in stochastic dispatch
models in [2], [3], [14], [25], [26], where the overall generator
recourse compensates for the mismatch between grid loads and
renewable forecast error realizations. However, since the affine
nature of generator response remains similar, the proposed
policy directly extends to balance renewable forecast errors.
To provide a succinct representation of the randomized OPF
variables, consider a topology matrix T ∈ R|N|×|L| whose
elements are such that:
Ti` =
 1, if line ` is downstream w.r.t. node i,−1, if line ` is upstream w.r.t. node i
0, otherwise.
Consider also an auxiliary row vector ρpi = Ti ◦αi that returns
a Schur product of ith row of T and ith row of α, and set
ρqi = ρ
p
i tanφi. If the grid DERs allow, the later can be relaxed
to model variable DER power factors. Using this notation, the
5perturbed OPF solution is modeled as the following set of
random variables:
g˜†i (ξ) = g
†
i + ρ
†
i ξ, ∀i ∈ N, (3a)
f˜†` (ξ) = f
†
` −
[
ρ†` +
∑
j∈D`
ρ†j
]
ξ, ∀` ∈ L, (3b)
u˜i(ξ) = ui + 2
∑
j∈Ri
[
rj
(
ρpj +
∑
k∈Dj
ρpk)+
xj
(
ρqj +
∑
k∈Dj
ρqk
)]
ξ, ∀i ∈ L, (3c)
where the randomized power flows f˜†i are obtained by substi-
tuting generator policy (2a) into (1c), and randomized voltage
magnitudes u˜i are expressed by substituting f˜
†
i into (1d), refer
to Appendix A for details. Each variable is thus represented
by its nominal component and its random component whose
realization depends on ξ. Furthermore, the random compo-
nents of power flows in (3b) and voltages (3c) also depend
on the generator dispatch decisions ρ†. Therefore, by properly
calibrating the parameters of ξ and finding the optimal dispatch
decisions, the randomized OPF solution in (3) provides the
required privacy guarantees (see Section IV-C, Theorem 2).
However, there is yet no guarantee that the randomized OPF
solution in (3) is feasible.
B. The Chance-Constrained Optimization Program
To obtain a feasible dispatch, the proposed mechanism uses
a chance-constrained program which optimizes the affine func-
tions in (3) to make OPF solution feasible for any realization
of random variable ξ with a high probability. The chance-
constrained program is obtained by substituting variables (3)
into the base OPF model (1) and enforcing chance constraints
on the grid limits. Its tractable formulation is provided in (5),
which is obtained considering the following reformulations.
1) Objective Function Reformulation: The chance-
constrained program minimizes the expected cost, which is
reformulated as follows:
Eξ
[∑
i∈N
cig˜
p
i
]
= Eξ
[∑
i∈N
ci(g
†
i + ρ
†
i ξ)
]
=
∑
i∈N
cig
p
i , ∀i ∈ N,
due to the zero-mean distribution of ξ.
2) Inner Polygon Approximation of the Quadratic Power
Flow Constraints: The substitution of the random power flow
variables in (3b) into the apparent power flow limit constraints
(1e) results in the following expression
(f˜p` )
2 + (f˜p` )
2 ≤ f¯2` , ∀` ∈ L,
which exhibits a quadratic dependency on random variable
ξ, for which no tractable chance-constrained reformulation is
known. To resolve this issue, the above quadratic constraint is
replaced by the inner polygon [22], [27], which writes as
γpc f˜
p
i + γ
q
c f˜
q
i + γ
s
cf i 6 0, ∀i ∈ L,∀c ∈ C, (4)
where γpc , γ
q
c , γ
s
c are the coefficients for each side c of the
polygon. The cardinality |C| is arbitrary, but a higher cardi-
nality brings a better accuracy. Equation (4) is not a relaxation
but an inner convex approximation: if the power flow solution
is feasible for (4), it is also feasible for the original quadratic
constraint (1e).
Algorithm 1: DP CC-OPF mechanism M˜
1 Input: D, ε, δ, β, ηg, ηu, ηf
2 Define covariance Σ = f(ε, δ, β) as per Theorem 2
3 Solve
?
V ← argmin problem (5) using D and Σ
4 Sample random perturbation ξˆ ∼ N (0,Σ)
5 Obtain final OPF solution from (3) using
?
V and ξˆ
6 Release: f˜†(ξˆ), u˜(ξˆ), g˜†(ξˆ)
3) Conic Reformulation of Linear Chance Constraints: For
the normally distributed variable ξ with known moments, the
chance constraint of the form Pξ[ξ>x 6 b] > 1−η is translated
into a second-order cone constraint as [28, Chapter 4.2.2]:
zη‖std(ξ>x)‖2 6 b− Eξ[ξ>x],
where zη = Φ−1(1− η) is the inverse cumulative distribution
function of the standard Gaussian distribution at the (1 − η)
quantile, and η is the constraint violation probability. There-
fore, the individual chance constraints on the generation, volt-
age, and power flow variables are formulated in a conic form
in (5c)–(5g), respectively. The resulting tractable formulation
of the chance-constrained OPF program is as follows:
CC-OPF : min
V={g†,f†,u,ρ†}
∑
i∈N
cig
p
i (5a)
s.t. Equations (1b)− (1d), (2b), (5b)
zηg
∥∥ρ†iσ∥∥2 6 g†i − g†i , ∀i ∈ N, (5c)
zηg
∥∥ρ†iσ∥∥2 6 g†i − g†i , ∀i ∈ N, (5d)
zηu
∥∥∥[ ∑
j∈Ri
[
rj
(
ρpj +
∑
k∈Dj
ρpk) + xj
(
ρqj +
∑
k∈Dj
ρqk
)]]
σ
∥∥∥
2
6 12 (ui − ui) , ∀i ∈ L, (5e)
zηu
∥∥∥[ ∑
j∈Ri
[
rj
(
ρpj +
∑
k∈Dj
ρpk) + xj
(
ρqj +
∑
k∈Dj
ρqk
)]]
σ
∥∥∥
2
6 12 (ui − ui) , ∀i ∈ L, (5f)
zηf
∥∥∥(γpc [ρp` + ∑
i∈D`
ρpi
]
+ γqc
[
ρq` +
∑
i∈D`
ρqi
])
σ
∥∥∥
2
6
− γpc fp` − γqcfq` − γscf `, ∀` ∈ L,∀c ∈ C. (5g)
C. The Privacy-Preserving Mechanism and Guarantees
The functioning of the privacy-preserving mechanism M˜ is
explained in Algorithm 1. The Algorithm first computes the
covariance matrix Σ that encodes the DP parameters (ε, δ),
and adjacency parameter β. The mechanism then solves the
optimization problem in (5) to obtain an optimal chance-
constrained solution
?
V. Last, the mechanism samples the
random perturbation and obtains the final OPF solution using
equations (3). By design of problem (5), the sampled OPF
solution is guaranteed to satisfy grid limits and customer loads
up to specified violation probabilities ηg, ηu and ηf , of the
generator, voltage, and power flow constraints.
The privacy guarantees, in turn, depend on the specification
of DP parameters (ε, δ) and the vector of adjacency coef-
ficients β. For simplicity, the DP parameters are assumed
to be uniform for all customers and specified by the DSO,
6whereas customer privacy preferences are expressed in the
submitted adjacency coefficients. In this setting, the load of
every customer i is guaranteed to be indistinguishable from
any other load in the range [dpi − βi, dpi + βi] in the release
of OPF solution related to node i up to DP parameters (ε, δ).
This guarantee is formalized by the following result.
Theorem 2 (Privacy Guarantees). Let (ε, δ) ∈ (0, 1) and
σi > βi
√
2ln(1.25/δ)/ε, ∀i ∈ L. Then, if problem (5) returns
an optimal solution, mechanism M˜ is (ε, δ)-differentially
private for β-adjacent load datasets. That is, the probabilities
of returning a power flow solution in set F p on any two β-
adjacent datasets D and D′ are such that
P[M˜(D) ∈ F p] 6 eεP[M˜(D′) ∈ F p] + δ,
where P denotes the probability over runs of M˜.
Proof. The full proof is available in Appendix B and relies on
two intermediate results summarized in Lemmas 1 and 2. The
first lemma shows that the standard deviation of power flow
related to customer i is at least as much as σi. Therefore,
by specifying σi, the DSO attains the desired degree of
randomization. The second lemma shows that βi > ∆βi , i.e.,
if σi is parameterized by βi, then σi is also parameterized
by sensitivity ∆βi , required by the Gaussian mechanism in
Theorem 1.
V. MECHANISM EXTENSIONS
A. OPF Variance Control
Due to the radial topology of distribution grids, the flow
perturbations along the same radial branch induce larger flow
variances than those intended by the covariance matrix Σ.
This section extends the mechanism M˜ to reduce the overall
flow variance while still preserving privacy guarantees. Two
strategies are proposed to achieve this goal.
1) Total Variance Minimization: The flow standard devia-
tion, obtained from (3b), depends on the DER participation
variables ρ†. Therefore, the variance of power flows can be
controlled by optimizing the DER dispatch. This variance
control strategy is enabled by replacing problem (5) at the
core of mechanism M˜ by the following optimization:
ToV-CC-OPF : min
V∪{t}
∑
i∈N
cig
p
i +
∑
`∈L
ψ`t` (6a)
s.t.
∥∥∥[ρp` + ∑
i∈D`
ρpi
]
σ
∥∥∥
2
6 t`, ∀` ∈ L, (6b)
Equations (5b)− (5g), (6c)
where the decision variable t` represents the standard deviation
of the active power flow in line `, which is penalized in
the objective function by a non-negative parameter ψ`. By
choosing ψ`,∀` ∈ L, the DSO minimizes the total variance
at the expense of operational cost. Note that, by Lemma 1,
optimization (6) does not violate the privacy guarantees.
2) Pursuing Target Variance: This strategy solely perturbs
the flow in the selected line of the radial branch (e.g., adjacent
to the customer with the strongest privacy requirement) and
constrains the DERs to maintain the flow variance in each
line as required by the original matrix Σ. It specifies a new
matrix Σˆ = diag([σˆ21 , . . . , σˆ
2
|L|]), 1
>σˆ2 6 1>σ2, that contains
a smaller number of perturbations. This control is enabled by
replacing problem (5) by the following optimization:
TaV-CC-OPF : min
V∪{t,τ}
∑
i∈N
cig
p
i +
∑
`∈L
ψ`τ` (7a)
s.t.
∥∥∥[ρp` + ∑
i∈D`
ρpi
]
σˆ
∥∥∥
2
6 t`, ∀` ∈ L, (7b)∥∥t` − σ`∥∥2 6 τ`, ∀` ∈ L, (7c)
Equations (5b)− (5g) with σˆ, (7d)
where, t` returns the resulting flow standard deviation, while
constraint (7c) yields the distance τ` between the resulting
standard deviation and original one σ` = Σ
1/2
`,` required to
provide customer at node ` with differential privacy. By pe-
nalizing this distance in the objective function, the DSO attains
privacy at a smaller amount of random perturbations. Note, as
optimization (7) acts on covariance matrix Σˆ instead of Σ, the
DSO needs to verify a posteriori that t` > σ`, ∀` ∈ L.
B. Optimality Loss Control
The application of mechanism M˜ necessarily leads to
an optimality loss compared to the solution of non-private
mechanism M. This section slightly abuses the notation and
denotes the cost of the non-private OPF solution and that of
the proposed DP mechanism when evaluated on a dataset D
by M(D) and M˜(D), respectively. The optimality loss Θ is
measured in expectation as the L2 distance, i.e.,
E[Θ] = ‖M(D)− E[M˜(D)]‖2,
as M(D) always provides a deterministic solution. However,
the worst-case realization of M˜(D) may significantly exceed
the expected value and lead to a larger optimality loss. To this
end, this section introduces the optimality loss control strategy
using the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure [13].
Consider %% of the worst-case realizations of the optimally
loss. The expected value of these worst-case realizations can
be modeled as a decision variable using the CVaR measure as
CVaR% = µc + σcφ
(
Φ−1(1− %)) /%, (8)
where µc and σc represent the expected value and standard
deviation of operational costs, while φ and Φ−1(1−%) denote
the probability density function and the inverse cumulative
distribution function at the (1 − %) quantile of the standard
Normal distribution. From Section (IV-B), it follows that
µc = E[c>g˜p] = E[c>(gp + ρξ)] = c>gp,
for zero-mean ξ, and the standard deviation finds as
σc = std[c>(gp + ρξ)] = std[c>(ρξ)] = ‖c>(ρσ)‖2,
providing a convex reformulation of the CVaR in (8). There-
fore, for some trade-off parameter θ ∈ [0, 1], the DSO can
trade off the mean and CVaR% of the optimality loss by
substituting problem (5) at the core of mechanism M˜ by the
following optimization CVaR-CC-OPF:
min
V∪σc
(1− θ)c>gp + θ [c>gp + σcφ (Φ−1(1− %)) /%] (9a)
7s.t. ‖c>(ρσ)‖2 6 σc, (9b)
Equations (5b)− (5g), (9c)
where the standard deviation σc is modeled as a decision
variable. Notice, the optimality loss control by means of (9)
does not violate the privacy guarantees as per Lemma 1.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
The experiments consider a modified 15-node radial grid
from [29], which includes network parameters taken from [30],
nodal loads as given in Table I, and nodal DERs with cost
coefficients drawn from Normal distribution ci ∼ N (10, 2)
$/MWh, generation limits gp
i
= 0 MW, gp
i
= 8 MW, and
power factor tanφi = 0.5, ∀i ∈ N. The constraint violation
probabilities are set as ηg = 1%, ηu = 2% and ηf = 10%.
The DP parameters are set to ε → 1, δ = 1/n = 0.071 with
n being a number of grid customers, while the adjacency
parameters βi,∀i ∈ L, vary across the experiments. All
models are implemented in Julia using the JuMP package [31],
and all data and codes are relegated to the e-companion [32].
A. Illustrative Example
The purpose of the illustrative example is to simulate and
obfuscate periodic components of the load profile in power
flow and voltage measurements. Assume that the customer at
node 7 has an atypical load pattern representing its produc-
tion technology. Her pattern is obtained by multiplying the
maximum load by k(t), a multiplier with the following three
periodic components:
k(t) =max
{
sin 5102 t,
7
10
}
+ 5102 sin
5
102 t+
25
103 sin
75
102 t
where t is the time step. The parameters of multiplier k(t)
are selected such that the load components have different
magnitudes and frequencies. The non-private OPF solution
provided by the D-OPF model leaks the information about this
pattern through the power flow fp7 and voltage v7 readings, as
displayed on the left plots in Fig. 3. To obfuscate the load
pattern in the OPF solution, the customer submits the privacy
preference β7, which is accommodated by the DSO using
mechanism M˜. Figure 3 shows that by setting β7 → 0.07
MW, the presence of the smallest periodic component is
obfuscated through randomization, while the presence of the
two remaining components is still distinguished. With an
increasing β7, the mechanism further obfuscates the medium
and largest periodic components.
B. Privacy Guarantees
To illustrate the privacy guarantees of Theorem 2, consider
the same grid customer at node 7 with the load of 2.35 MW. For
β7, consider two adjacent load datasets D′ and D′′, containing
d′p7 = d
p
7−β7 and d′′p7 = dp7+β7, respectively. The non-private
OPF mechanism returns the following power flows
M(D′) = 2.05MW, M(D) =2.35MW, M(D′′) = 2.65MW,
for β7 = 0.3 MW, clearly distinguishing the differences
in datasets through power flow readings. The differentially
private mechanism M˜ in Algorithm 1, in turn, obfuscates
the load value used in the computation. Figure 4 shows
that the mechanism makes the OPF solutions on the three
datasets similar in the probabilistic sense, thus providing pri-
vacy guarantees for the original load dataset D. The maximal
difference between the distributions of power flow solutions
is bounded by the parameters ε and δ. Observe that the larger
specification δ = 0.75 results in weaker guarantees, as the
distributions slightly stand out from one another. On the other
hand, δ = 0.07 yields a larger noise magnitude overlapping
the support of the three distributions. The OPF solution to be
implemented is obtained from a single sample drawn from the
blue distribution. By observing a single sample, an adversary
cannot distinguish the distribution, and thus the dataset, it
was sampled from. Finally, Fig. 4 shows randomized OPF
solutions obtained on a given load dataset. The parameters
of the noise, however, are independent from load dataset (see
Theorem 2), and the privacy guarantee for the customer at
node 7 is independent from the loads and their variations at
other grid nodes.
C. OPF Variance Control
Consider the application of the mechanism when all grid
customers have their adjacency coefficients set to 10% of
their loads. The non-private D-OPF and private OPF solutions,
obtained with the variance-agnostic CC-OPF and variance-
aware ToV- and TaV-CC-OPF models, are summarized in
Table I: Each row i presents the power flow and voltage
solutions related to customer i, and the bottom rows report
the expected operational cost, optimality loss E[Θ] in %, sum
of power flow standard deviations, percentage ηˆ of infeasible
instances on 5000 noise samples, and CPU times.
The table shows that, unlike non-private, deterministic D-
OPF model, the DP mechanisms return OPF variables as
probability densities with given means and standard deviations.
For all three DP mechanisms, the flow standard deviations
are at least as much as those required by Theorem 2, thus
providing differential privacy. However, due to the noise
applied to each network flow, the flow standard deviations
provided by the CC-OPF model exceed the intended quantities,
e.g., by 458% for the first customer close to the substation.
To minimize the OPF variance, the ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-CC-
OPF models are used with the uniform variance penalty factor
ψ` = 10
5,∀` ∈ L. The ToV-CC-OPF model also perturbs each
flow in the network but it alters the optimal DER dispatch
to reduce the sum of flow standard deviations by 50%. The
TaV-CC-OPF model, in turn, introduces a limited number of
perturbations to lines {1, 5− 7, 9, 11− 13} and constrains the
DERs to maintain the intended standard deviation σ across the
entire network, reducing the flow standard deviation by 63%.
As ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-CC-OPF prioritize the flow variance
over expected cost, the models provide larger optimality loss
than the CC-OPF model.
The OPF solution to be implemented by the DSO is a
sample drawn from the probability densities reported in Table
I. The empirical probability of the joint constraint violation
ηˆ demonstrates an appropriate out-of-sample performance.
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C. OPF Variance Control
Consider the application of the mechanism when all grid
customers have their adjacency coefficients set to 10% of
their loads. The non-private D-OPF and private OPF solutions,
obtained with the variance-agnostic CC-OPF and variance-
aware ToV- and TaV-CC-OPF models, are summarized in
Table I: Each row i presents the power flow and voltage
solutions related to customer i, and the bottom rows report
the expected operational cost, optimality loss E[⇥] in %, sum
of power flow standard deviations, percentage ⌘ˆ of infeasible
instances on 5000 noise samples, and CPU times.
The table shows that, unlike non-private, deterministic D-
OPF model, the DP mechanisms return OPF variables as
probability densities with given means and standard deviations.
For all three DP mechanisms, the flow standard deviations
are at least as much as those required by Theorem 2, thus
providing differential privacy. However, due to the noise
applied to each network flow, the flow standard deviations
provided by the CC-OPF model exceed the intended quantities,
e.g., by 458% for the first customer close to the substation.
To minimize the OPF variance, the ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-CC-
OPF models are used with the uniform variance penalty factor
 ` = 10
5, 8` 2 L. The ToV-CC-OPF model also perturbs each
flow in the network but it alters the optimal DER dispatch
to reduce the sum of flow standard deviations by 50%. The
TaV-CC-OPF model, in turn, introduces a limited number of
perturbations to lines {1, 5  7, 9, 11  13} and constrains the
DERs to maintain the intended standard deviation   across the
entire network, reducing the flow standard deviation by 63%.
As ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-CC-OPF prioritize the flow variance
over expected cost, the models provide larger optimality loss
than the CC-OPF model.
The OPF solution to be implemented by the DSO is a
sample drawn from the probability densities reported in Table
I. The empirical probability of the joint constraint violation
⌘ˆ demonstrates an appropriate out-of-sample performance.
However, if the DP mechanism returns an infeasible sample,
the DSO may re-sample the OPF solution at the expense of a
marginal relaxation of privacy guarantees. Finally, the privacy-
preserving mechanisms keep the CPU time acceptable.
D. Optimality Loss Control
The DSO is capable to trade off between the expected and
the worst-case optimality loss by substituting the CC-OPF
model in mechanism M˜ by the CVaR-CC-OPF model in (8).
Consider the same setting as in the previous section. For a
trade-off parameter ✓ 2 [0, 1], the expected optimality loss in
% = 10% of the worst-case scenarios is contrasted with the
expected loss in Table II. For ✓ = 0, the CVaR10% signif-
icantly exceeds the expected value. However, by increasing
✓, the DSO alters the DER dispatch to reduce the worst-case
optimality loss at the expense of increasing the expected value.
For ✓ > 0.7, the expected value corresponds to CVaR10%, thus
providing differential privacy at a fixed cost. Eventually, the
choice of ✓ is driven by the DSO’s risk preference.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a differentially private OPF mech-
anism for distribution grids, which provides formal pri-
vacy guarantees for grid customer loads. The mechanism
parametrizes OPF variables as affine functions of a carefully
calibrated noise to weaken the correlations between grid loads
and OPF variables, thus preventing the recovery of customer
loads from the voltage and power flow measurements. Fur-
thermore, the mechanism was extended to enable the DSO
to control the OPF variance induced by the noise in the
computations, providing better practices for systems with
Fig. 3. Power flow and voltage magnitude at node 7 as functions of adjacency coefficient β7. The flow and voltage solutions are given by their mean value
(blue) and the range of ±3 standard deviations (light blue). The OPF solution implemented by the DSO is given by sample trajectories (red).
TABLE I
SOLUTION SUMMARY FOR THE NON-PRIVATE AND DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE OPF MECHANISMS.
i dpi σi
D-OPF, Eq. (1) CC-OPF, Eq. (5) ToV-CC-OPF, Eq. (6) TaV-CC-OPF, Eq. (7)
fpi vi
fpi vi f
p
i vi f
p
i vi
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
0 0 – – 1.00 – – 1.00 – – – 1.00 – – – 1.00 –
1 2.01 0.48 8.5 1.00 11.3 2.68 1.00 0.0016 12.6 0.69 1.00 0.0004 13.0 0.48 1.00 0.0003
2 2.01 0.48 6.5 1.00 9.3 2.68 0.99 0.0057 11.4 0.71 0.99 0.0015 11.0 0.48 0.99 0.0010
3 2.01 0.48 4.4 1.00 7.3 2.68 0.99 0.0123 10.2 0.78 0.97 0.0033 9.0 0.48 0.98 0.0022
4 1.73 0.41 -8.0 1.00 -1.4 1.72 0.99 0.0128 3.6 0.69 0.97 0.0034 1.7 0.41 0.98 0.0023
5 2.91 0.70 5.1 1.00 3.1 0.87 0.99 0.0128 2.5 0.82 0.97 0.0035 1.9 0.70 0.98 0.0024
6 2.19 0.52 2.2 1.00 0.1 0.87 0.99 0.0128 0.7 0.63 0.97 0.0038 1.0 0.52 0.98 0.0024
7 2.35 0.56 2.3 0.99 0.9 0.63 0.98 0.0134 0.9 0.61 0.97 0.0039 1.0 0.56 0.98 0.0024
8 2.35 0.56 10.5 0.99 6.7 1.18 0.98 0.0130 5.8 0.78 0.97 0.0036 6.4 0.56 0.98 0.0023
9 2.29 0.55 5.8 0.99 3.5 0.88 0.98 0.0132 3.1 0.70 0.97 0.0037 3.6 0.55 0.98 0.0023
10 2.17 0.52 3.5 0.99 1.2 0.88 0.98 0.0135 1.6 0.65 0.97 0.0038 1.3 0.52 0.97 0.0023
11 1.32 0.32 1.3 0.99 0.4 0.39 0.98 0.0135 0.4 0.40 0.97 0.0038 0.6 0.32 0.97 0.0023
12 2.01 0.48 6.5 1.00 3.6 1.23 1.00 0.0008 3.3 0.73 1.00 0.0004 3.6 0.48 1.00 0.0003
13 2.24 0.54 4.5 0.99 1.6 1.23 1.00 0.0034 2.1 0.72 1.00 0.0019 3.2 0.54 0.99 0.0012
14 2.24 0.54 2.2 0.99 -0.6 1.23 1.00 0.0050 0.8 0.64 0.99 0.0027 1.0 0.54 0.99 0.0018
cost (E[Θ]) $396.0 (0%) $428.0 (8.1%) $463.5 (17.1%) $459.3 (16.0%)∑
i std[f
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CPU time 0.016s 0.037s 0.043s 0.052s
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Fig. 4. Power flow and voltage magnitude at node 7 as functions of adjacency coefficient  7. The flow and voltage solutions are given by their mean value
(bl e) and the range of ±3 standard deviations (light blue). The OPF solution implemented by the DSO is given by sample trajectories (red).
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Fig. 5. The overlay of power flow probability densities obtained on the three
 7 adjacent load datasets for   = 0.75 and   = 0.07.
C. OPF Variance Control
Co sid r the application of the mechanism when all grid
customers have their adjacency coefficients set to 10% of
their loads. The non-private D-OPF and private OPF solutions,
ob ained with the variance-agnostic CC-OPF and varianc -
aware ToV- and TaV-CC-OPF models, are summarized in
Table I: Each row i presents the power flow and voltage
solutions related to customer i, and the bottom rows report
the expected operational cost, optimality loss E[⇥] in %, sum
of power flow standard deviations, percentage ⌘ˆ of infeasible
instances on 5000 noise samples, and CPU times.
The table shows that, unlike non-private, deterministic D-
OPF model, the DP mechanisms return OPF variables as
probability densities with given means and standard deviations.
For all three DP mechanisms, the flow standard deviations
are at least as much as those required by Theorem 2, thus
providing differential privacy. However, due to the noise
applied to each network flow, the flow standard deviations
provided by the CC-OPF model exceed the intended quantities,
e.g., by 458% for the first customer close to the substation.
To minimize the OPF variance, the ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-CC-
OPF models are used with the uniform variance penalty factor
 ` = 10
5, 8` 2 L. The ToV-CC-OPF model also perturbs each
flow in the network but it alters the optimal DER dispatch
to reduce the sum of flow standard deviations by 50%. The
TaV-CC-OPF model, in turn, introduces a limited number of
perturbations to lines {1, 5  7, 9, 11  13} and constrains the
DERs to maintain the intended standard deviation   across the
entire network, reducing the flow standard deviation by 63%.
As ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-CC-OPF prioritize the flow variance
over expected cost, the models provide larger optimality loss
than the CC-OPF model.
The OPF solution to be implemented by the DSO is a
sample drawn from the probability densities reported in Table
I. The empirical probability of the joint constraint violation
⌘ˆ demonstrates an appropriate out-of-sample performance.
However, if the DP mechanism returns an infeasible sample,
the DSO may re-sample the OPF solution at the expense of a
marginal relaxation of privacy guarantees. Finally, the privacy-
preserving mechanisms keep the CPU time acceptable.
D. ptim lity Loss Control
The DSO is capable to trade off between the expected and
the worst-case optimality loss by substituting the CC-OPF
model in mechanism M˜ by the CVaR-CC-OPF model in (8).
Consider the same setting as in the previous section. For a
trade-off parameter ✓ 2 [0, 1], the expected optimality loss in
% = 10% of the worst-case scenarios is contrasted with the
expected loss in Table II. For ✓ = 0, the CVaR10% signif-
icantly exceeds the expected value. However, by increasing
✓, the DSO alters the DER dispatch to reduce the worst-case
optimality loss at the expense of increasing the expected value.
For ✓ > 0.7, the expected value corresponds to CVaR10%, thus
providing differential privacy at a fixed cost. Eventually, the
choice of ✓ is driven by the DSO’s risk preference.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a differentially private OPF mech-
anism for distribution grids, which provides formal pri-
vacy guarantees for grid customer loads. The mechanism
parametrizes OPF variables as affine functions of a carefully
calibrated noise to weaken the correlations between grid loads
and OPF variables, thus preventing the recovery of customer
loads from the voltage and power flow measurements. Fur-
thermore, the mechanism was extended to enable the DSO
to control the OPF variance induced by the noise in the
computations, providing better practices for systems with
Fig. 4. The overlay of power flow probability densities obtained on the three
β7−adjacent load datasets for δ = 0.75 and δ = 0.07 (5000 samples).
However, if DP mechanism r turns an nfeasible sample,
the DSO may re-sample th OPF solut o , yet it comes at
the expen e of the relaxation of privacy guarantees: every re-
sampling round incre ses the privacy loss linearly, by ε, as per
composition of DP [24, Th orem 3.14]. Finally, the privacy-
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Fig. 4. Power flow and voltage magnitude at node 7 as functions of adjacency coefficient  7. The flow and voltage solutions are given by their mean value
(blue) and the range of ±3 standard deviations (light blue). The OPF solution implemented by the DSO is given by sample trajectories (red).
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Fig. 5. The overlay of power flow probability densities obtained on the three
 7 adjacent load datasets for   = 0.75 and   = 0.07.
C. OPF Variance Control
Consider the application of the mechanism when all grid
customers have their adjacency coefficients set to 10% of
their loads. The non-private D-OPF and private OPF solutions,
obtained with the variance-agnostic CC-OPF and variance-
aware ToV- and TaV-CC-OPF models, are summarized in
Table I: Each row i prese ts th power fl w and voltag
solutions related to customer i, and the bottom row rep rt
the expected operational cost, optimality loss E[⇥] in %, sum
of power flow standard deviations, percentage ⌘ˆ of infeasible
instances on 5000 noise samples, and CPU times.
The table shows that, unlike non-private, deterministic D-
OPF model, the DP mechanisms return OPF variables as
probability densities with given means and standard deviations.
For all three DP mechanisms, the flow standard deviations
are at least as much as those required by Theorem 2, thus
providing differential privacy. H wever, due to the nois
applied to each network flow, the flow standard deviations
provided by the CC-OPF model exceed the intended quantities,
e.g., by 458% for the first customer close to the substation.
To minimize the OPF variance, the To - - PF and TaV-CC-
OPF models are used with t uniform variance penalty factor
 ` = 10
5, 8` 2 L. The ToV-CC-OPF model also perturbs each
flow in the network but it alters the optimal DER dispatch
to reduce the sum of flow standard deviations by 50%. The
TaV-CC-OPF model, in turn, introduces a limited number of
perturbations to lines {1, 5  7, 9, 11  13} and constrains the
DERs to maintain the intended standard deviation   across the
entire network, reducing the flow standard deviation by 63%.
As ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-CC-OPF prioritize the flow variance
ov r expe ted cost, the models provide larger opti lity loss
than the CC-OPF model.
The OPF solution to be implemented by the DSO is a
sample drawn from the probability densities reported in Table
I. The empirical probability of the joint constraint violation
⌘ˆ demonstrates an appr priate out-of-sample perform nce.
However, if the DP echanism retur an infeasible sample,
the DSO may re-sample the OPF solution at the expense of a
marginal relaxation of privacy guarantees. Finally, the privacy-
preserving mechanisms keep the CPU time acceptable.
D. Optimality Loss Control
The DSO is capable to trade off between the expected and
the worst-case optimality loss by substituting the CC-OPF
model in mechanism M˜ by the CVaR-CC-OPF model in (8).
Consider the same setting as in the previous sectio . For a
trade-off parameter ✓ 2 [0, 1], the expected optimality loss in
% = 10% of the worst-cas scenarios is contrasted with the
expected loss in Table II. For ✓ = 0, the CVaR10% signif-
icantly exceeds the expected value. However, by increasing
✓, the DSO alters the DER dispat t reduce the worst-case
optimality loss at the expense of in r sing th exp cted value.
For ✓ > 0.7, the expected value corresponds to CVaR10%, thus
providing differential privacy at a fixed cost. Eventually, the
choice of ✓ is driven by the DSO’s risk preference.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a differentially private OPF mech-
anism for distribution grids, which provid s formal pri-
vacy guarantees for grid customer loads. The mechanism
parametrizes OPF variables as affine fun tions of a car fully
calibrated noise to weaken the correlations between grid loads
and OPF variables, thus preventing the recovery of customer
loads from the voltage and power flow measurements. Fur-
thermore, the mechanism was extended to enable the DSO
to control the OPF variance induced by the noise in the
co putations, providing better practices for systems with
Fig. 3. Power flow and voltage magnitude at node 7 as functions of adjacency coefficient  7. The flow and voltage solutions are given by their mean value
(blue) and the range of ±3 standard deviations (light blue). The OPF solution implemented by the DSO is given by sample trajectories (red).
TABLE I
SOLUTION SUMMARY FOR THE NON-PRIVATE AND DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE OPF MECHANISMS.
i dpi  i
D-OPF, Eq. (1) CC-OPF, Eq. (5) ToV-CC-OPF, Eq. (6) TaV-CC-OPF, Eq. (7)
fpi vi
fpi vi f
p
i vi f
p
i vi
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
0 0 – – 1.00 – – 1.00 – – – 1.00 – – – 1.00 –
1 2.01 0.48 8.5 1.00 11.3 2.68 1.00 0.0016 12.6 0.69 1.00 0.0004 13.0 0.48 1.00 0.0003
2 2.01 0.48 6.5 1.00 9.3 2.68 0.99 0.0057 11.4 0.71 0.99 0.0015 11.0 0.48 0.99 0.0010
3 2.01 0.48 4.4 1.00 7.3 2.68 0.99 0.0123 10.2 0.78 0.97 0.0033 9.0 0.48 0.98 0.0022
4 1.73 0.41 -8.0 1.00 -1.4 1.72 0.99 0.0128 3.6 0.69 0.97 .0034 1.7 0.41 0.98 0.0023
5 2.91 0.70 5.1 1.00 3.1 0.87 0.99 0.0128 2.5 0.82 0.97 0.0035 1.9 0.70 0.98 0.0024
6 2.19 0.52 2.2 1.00 0.1 0.87 0.99 0.0128 0.7 0.63 0.97 0.0038 1.0 0.52 0.98 0.0024
7 2.35 0.56 2.3 .99 0.9 0.63 0.98 0.0134 0.9 0.61 0.97 0.0039 1.0 0.56 0.98 0.0024
8 2.35 0.56 10.5 99 6.7 1.18 0.98 0.0130 5. 0.78 0.97 0.0036 6.4 0.56 0.98 0.0023
9 2.29 0.55 5.8 0.99 3.5 0.88 0.98 0.0132 3.1 0.70 0.97 0.0037 3.6 0.55 0.98 0.0023
10 2.17 0.52 3.5 0.99 1.2 0.88 0.98 0.0135 1.6 0.65 0.97 0.0038 1.3 0.52 0.97 0.0023
11 1.32 0.32 1.3 0.99 0.4 0.39 0.98 0.0135 0.4 0.40 0.97 0.0038 0.6 0.32 0.97 0.0023
12 2.01 0.48 6.5 1.00 3.6 1.23 1.0 0.0008 3.3 0.73 1.00 0.0004 3.6 0.48 1.00 0.0003
13 2.24 0.54 4.5 99 1.6 1.23 1.0 0.0034 2.1 0.72 1.00 0.0019 3.2 0.54 0.99 0.0012
14 2.24 0.54 2.2 0.99 -0.6 1.23 1.00 0.0050 0.8 0.64 0.99 0.0027 1.0 0.54 0.99 0.0018
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i Std[f
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Fig. 5. The overlay of power flow probability densi ies obtained on three
 7 adjacent load datasets for   = 0.75 and   = 0.07.
C. OPF Variance Control
Co sid r the application of the mechanism when all grid
customers have their adjacency coefficients set to 10% of
their loads. The non-private D-OPF and private OPF solutions,
ob ained with the variance-agnostic CC-OPF and varianc -
aware ToV- and TaV-CC-OPF models, are summarized in
Table I: Each row i presents the power flow and voltage
solutions related to customer i, and the bottom rows report
the expected operational cost, optimality loss E[⇥] in %, sum
of power flow standard deviations, percentage ⌘ˆ of infeasible
instances on 5000 noise samples, and CPU times.
The table shows that, unlike non-private, deterministic D-
OPF model, the DP mechanisms return OPF variables as
probability densities with given means and standard deviations.
For all three DP mechanisms, the flow standard deviations
are at least as much as those required by heorem 2, thus
providing differential privacy. However, due to the noise
applied to each network flow, the flow standard deviations
provided by the CC-OPF model exceed the intended quantities,
e.g., by 458% for the first customer close to the substation.
To minimize the OPF variance, the ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-CC-
OPF models are used with the uniform variance penalty factor
 ` = 10
5, 8` 2 L. The ToV-CC-OPF model also perturbs each
flow in the network but it alters the optimal DER dispatch
to reduce the sum of flow standard deviations by 50%. The
TaV-CC-OPF model, in turn, introduces a limited number of
perturbations to lines {1, 5  7, 9, 11  13} and constrains the
DERs to maintain the intended standard deviation   across the
entire network, reducing th flo standard deviation by 63%.
As ToV-CC-OPF and TaV-C -O rioritize the flow variance
over expected cost, the models provide larger optimality loss
than the CC-OPF model.
The OPF solution to be implemented by the DSO is a
sample drawn from the probability densities reported in Table
I. The empirical probability of the j int constraint violation
⌘ˆ dem nstrates an appropriate out-of-sample performance.
However, i the DP mechani m returns an infeasible sample,
the DSO may re-sample the OPF solution at the expense of a
marginal relaxation of privacy guarantees. Finally, the privacy-
preserving mechanisms keep the CPU time acceptable.
D. ptim lity Loss Control
The DSO is ca able to trad off between the expected and
the worst-case optimality loss by substituting the CC-OPF
model in mechanism M˜ by the CVaR-CC-OPF model in (8).
Consider the same setting as in the previous section. For a
trade-off parameter ✓ 2 [0, 1], the expected optimality loss in
% = 10% of the worst-case scenarios is contrasted with the
expected loss in Table II. For ✓ = 0, the a 10% signif-
icantly exceeds th expected value. However, by increasing
✓, the DSO alters the DER dispatch to reduce the worst-case
optimality loss at the expense of increasing the expected value.
For ✓ > 0.7, the expected value corresponds to CVaR10%, thus
providing differential privacy at a fixed cost. Eventually, the
choice of ✓ is driven by the DSO’s risk preference.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a differentially private OPF mech-
anism for distribution grids, which provides formal pri-
vacy guarantees for grid customer loads. The mechanism
parametrizes OPF variables as affine functions of a carefully
calibrated noise to weaken the correlations between grid loads
and OPF variables, thus preventing the recovery of customer
loads from the voltage and power flow measurements. Fur-
thermore, the mechanism was extended to enable the DSO
to control the OPF variance induced by the noise in the
computations, providing better practices for systems with
Fig. 4. The overlay of power flow probability densities obtained on the three
 7 adjacent load datasets for   = 0.75 and   = 0.07 (5000 samples).
of the wo s -case outcomes is shown very small on out-
f- ample, the exp cted value over 10% f the worst-case
outcomes is at relatively large 20.7%. The DSO. however,
is c pable to trad off b tw en the expected and the worst-
case opti ality loss by substituti g the CC-OPF m d l
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optimality loss, ⇥[%]
Fig. 5. CVaR-CC-OPF: Empirical out-of-sample density of the optimality
loss for a trade-off parameter ✓ = 0 (5000 samples)
m ch nism M˜ by the CVaR-CC-OPF odel in (9). For a
trade-off p ramet r ✓ 2 [0, 1], the exp ct d optimality l ss in
% = 10% of th worst-case sc narios is contrasted with the
expected loss in Table II. For ✓ = 0, the CVaR10% signif-
icantly exceeds the expected value. However, by increasing
✓, the DSO alte s the DER dispatch to reduce the worst-case
Fig. 5. CVaR-CC-OPF: Empirical out-of-sample density of the optimality
loss for a trad -off param ter θ = 0 (5000 samples)
preserving mechanisms keep the CPU time within the same
time-fram as the standard, non-private D-OPF mechanism.
D. Optimality Loss Control
The application of mechanism M˜ yields an optimality loss
with respect to the solution of the standard, on-private OPF
9TABLE II
TRADE-OFFS OF THE EXPECTED AND CVAR10% PERFORMANCE
θ
exp. value CVaR10% ∑
i std[f
p
i ], MWcost, $ Θ,% cost, $ Θ,%
0.0 428.0 8.1 478.1 20.7 19.1
0.1 428.0 8.1 476.3 20.3 19.4
0.2 428.3 8.2 475.0 19.9 19.6
0.3 428.9 8.3 473.3 19.5 19.8
0.4 431.9 9.1 467.8 18.1 17.3
0.5 434.5 9.7 464.4 17.3 15.7
0.6 438.2 10.7 461.7 16.6 14.6
0.7 452.9 14.4 452.9 14.4 13.0
mechanism. For the same setting as in the previous experiment,
the out-of-sample empirical distribution of the cost is depicted
in Fig. VI-D. Observe that the probability mass is centered
at 8.1% of optimality loss and that the distribution is biased
towards smaller optimality losses. Although the probability
of the worst-case outcomes is shown very small on out-
of-sample, the expected value over 10% of the worst-case
outcomes is at relatively large 20.7%. The DSO, however,
is capable to trade off between the expected and the worst-
case optimality loss by substituting the CC-OPF model in
mechanism M˜ by the CVaR-CC-OPF model in (9). For a
trade-off parameter θ ∈ [0, 1], the expected optimality loss in
% = 10% of the worst-case scenarios is contrasted with the
expected loss in Table II. For θ = 0, the CVaR10% signif-
icantly exceeds the expected value. However, by increasing
θ, the DSO alters the DER dispatch to reduce the worst-case
optimality loss at the expense of increasing the expected value.
For θ > 0.7, the expected value corresponds to CVaR10%, thus
providing differential privacy at a fixed cost. Eventually, the
choice of θ is driven by the DSO’s risk preference. Finally,
the optimality loss can be further reduced by relaxing the
feasibility guarantee with larger probabilities η, though it may
result in an increasing out-of-sample violation probability ηˆ.
E. Comparison with the Output Perturbation Mechanism
It remains to compare the proposed privacy-preserving OPF
mechanism with the standard, non-adapted to the specifics of
OPF problems, output perturbation (OP) mechanism [24]. The
functioning of this mechanism is depicted in Algorithm 2: it
solves the deterministic OPF problem, perturbs the optimal
power flow solution with the random noise, and then finds
the feasible DER and substation dispatch that satisfies AC-
OPF equations for the perturbed values of power flows. If
exists, the mechanism returns an (ε, δ)−differentially private
OPF solution on β−adjacent datasets, or reports infeasibility
otherwise. Observe, unlike the proposed mechanism in Al-
gorithm 1, the output perturbation mechanism does not offer
feasibility guarantees, because the perturbation step is done
independently from the OPF computations.
To compare the two mechanisms, consider the provision
of differential privacy for sets of nodes 1 : n, i.e., from 1
to n, for which βi → 10%. By increasing n, the amount
of noise that the DSO needs to accommodate in the grid
increases. Table III summarizes the feasibility statistics for
Algorithm 2: Output Perturbation (OP) Mechanism
1 Input: D, ε, δ, β
2 Solve {
?
fp` }∀`∈L ← argmin problem (1) using D
3 Sample ξˆ` ∼ N (0, β`
√
2ln(1.25/δ)/ε),∀` ∈ L
4 Perturb power flows fˆp` =
?
fp` +ξˆ`,∀` ∈ L
5 Re-solve problem (1) for the fixed fp` = fˆ
p
` ,∀` ∈ L
6 if problem (1) feasible then
7 Implement perturbed solution
8 else
9 Report infeasibility
10 end
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF INFEASIBLE OPF INSTANCES (5000 SAMPLES) [%]
Mechanism Node set 1 : n (with non-zero adjacency βi)1 1:2 1:3 1:4 1:5 ... 1:14
OP 52.1 87.0 97.9 99.7 100 ... 100
CC-OPF 0.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 ... 3.3
the two algorithms. Observe, even for a single customer, the
output perturbation mechanism produces infeasible solutions
in 52.1% of instances, and its performance further reduces
in n. By optimizing affine functions in (3), the proposed
mechanism, instead, produces feasible OPF instances with a
high probability, e.g. 96.7% for the entire set of customers.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper introduced a differentially private OPF mech-
anism for distribution grids, which provides formal pri-
vacy guarantees for grid customer loads. The mechanism
parametrizes OPF variables as affine functions of a carefully
calibrated noise to weaken the correlations between grid loads
and OPF variables, thus preventing the recovery of customer
loads from the voltage and power flow measurements. Fur-
thermore, the mechanism was extended to enable the DSO
to control the OPF variance induced by the noise in the
computations, providing better practices for systems with
more emphasis on component overloads than on operational
costs. Finally, the optimality loss induced by the mechanism
translates into privacy costs. To minimize the risk of large
privacy costs, the mechanism was extended to enable the trade-
off between the expected and worst-case performances.
There are several avenues for future work. To understand the
impacts of the privacy preservation on distribution electricity
pricing, one can explore the connection between DP parame-
ters and distribution locational marginal prices following price
decomposition approach from [22] and [29]. Alternatively, the
coalition game theory can be used to find an adequate privacy
cost allocation among customers, similar to game-theoretic
reserve cost allocation in [33]. Finally, the private OPF mecha-
nism has been developed in a technically suitable ecosystem: it
builds upon LinDistFlow OPF equations neglecting the effects
of power losses, adopts a constant DER power factor, and does
not include the control of stochastic DERs. Although these
three factors are well-studied in the context of the chance-
constrained OPF problems under uncertainty, it remains valid,
10
if not crucial, for future work to explore their effects on the
limits of the differential privacy provision in distribution grids.
APPENDIX
A. System Response to the Random Perturbation
The affine dependency of power flows on the random
perturbation is obtain by substituting generator response policy
(2a) into OPF equations (1c), that is:
f˜†` (ξ) =d
†
` − g†` (ξ) +
∑
i∈D`
(d†i − g†i (ξ))
=d†` − g†` − ρ†`ξ +
∑
i∈D`
(d†i − g†i − ρ†i ξ)
=d†` − g†` +
∑
i∈D`
(d†i − g†i )− [ρ†`ξ +
∑
i∈D`
ρ†i ξ]
due to (1c)
= f†` −
[
ρ†` +
∑
j∈D`
ρ†j
]
ξ, ∀` ∈ L, (10a)
where f†` is the nominal (average) component and the last
term is the random flow component. The affine dependency of
voltages on the random perturbation is obtain by substituting
(10a) into voltage drop equation (1d), that is:
u˜i(ξ) =u0 − 2
∑
`∈Ri
(f˜p` (ξ)r` + f˜
q
` (ξ)x`)
=u0 − 2
∑
`∈Ri
(fp` r` + f
q
` x`)
+ 2
∑
`∈Ri
[
r`
(
ρp` +
∑
k∈D`
ρpk
)
+ x`
(
ρq` +
∑
k∈D`
ρqk
)]
ξ
due to (1d)
= ui + 2
∑
`∈Ri
[
r`
(
ρp` +
∑
k∈D`
ρpk
)
+ x`
(
ρq` +
∑
k∈D`
ρqk
)]
ξ,
(10b)
where ui is the nominal (average) component and the last term
is the random voltage component. Together with the response
policy in (2a), equations (10) constitute the model of system
response to the random perturbation, given in equations (3).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on Lemmas 1 and 2. The first
lemma shows that the standard deviation of power flow related
to customer i is at least as much as σi. Therefore, by specifying
σi, the DSO attains the desired degree of randomization.
Lemma 1. If OPF mechanism (5) returns optimal solution,
then σ` is the lower bound on std[f˜
p
` ].
Proof. Consider a single flow perturbation with ξ` ∼ N (0, σ2` )
and ξj = 0, ∀j ∈ L\`. The standards deviation of active
power flow (3b) in optimum finds as
std
[ ?
fp` −
[ ?
ρp` +
∑
j∈D`
?
ρpj
]
ξ
]
= std
[[ ?
ρp` +
∑
j∈D`
?
ρpj
]
ξ
]
= std
[ ∑
j∈D`
?
αj`ξ`
]
(2b)
= std
[
ξ`
]
= σ`, (11)
where the second to the last equality follows from balancing
conditions (2b). As for any pair (`, j) ∈ L the covariance
matrix returns Σ`,j = 0, σ` is a lower bound on std[f˜
p
` ] in the
optimum for any additional perturbation in the network.
Remark 1. The result of Lemma 1 holds independently from
the choice of objective function and is solely driven by the
feasibility conditions.
The second lemma shows that βi > ∆βi , i.e., if σi is pa-
rameterized by βi, then σi is also parameterized by sensitivity
∆βi .
Lemma 2. Let D and D′ be two adjacent datasets differing
in at most one load dpi by at most βi > 0. Then,
∆βi = max
`∈L
‖M(D)|fp` −M(D′)|fp` ‖2 6 βi,
where the notation M(·)|fp` denotes the value of the optimal
active power flow on line ` returned by the computationM(·).
Proof. Let
?
fp` be the optimal solution for the active power
flow in line ` obtained on input dataset D = (dp1, . . . , d
p
n).
From OPF equation (1c), it can be written as
?
fp` = d
p
` −
?
gp` +
∑
i∈D`
(dpi −
?
gpi ),
which expresses the flow as a function of the downstream
loads and the optimal DER dispatch. A change in the active
load dp` translates into a change of power flow as
∂
?
fp`
∂dp`
=
∂dp`
∂dp`︸︷︷︸
1
−∂
?
gp`
∂dp`
+
∑
i∈D`
( ∂dpi
∂dp`︸︷︷︸
0
−∂
?
gpi
∂dp`
)
= 1− ∂
?
gp`
∂dp`
− ∑
i∈D`
∂
?
gpi
∂dp`
, (12)
where the last two terms are always non-negative due to
convexity of model (1). The value of (12) attains maximum
when
?
gpk = g
p
k 7→
∂
?
gpk
∂dp`
= 0, ∀k ∈ {`} ∪D`. (13)
Therefore, by combining (12) with (13) we obtain the
maximal change of power flows as
∂
?
fp`
∂dp`
= 1.
Since the dataset adjacency relation considers loads dp` that
differ by at most β`, it suffices to multiply the above by β` to
attain the result. It finds similarly that for a βi change of any
load i ∈ N, all network flows change by at most βi.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a customer at non-root node i.
Mechanism M˜ induces a perturbation on the active power
flow fpi by a random variable ξi ∼ N (0, σ2i ). The randomized
active power flow fpi is then given as follows:
f˜pi =
?
fpi −
[ ?
ρpi +
∑
j∈Di
?
ρpj
]
ξ,
11
where ? denotes optimal solution for optimization variables.
For privacy parameters (ε, δ), the mechanism specifies
σi > βi
√
2ln(1.25/δ)/ε, ∀i ∈ L.
As per Lemma 1, we know that σi is the lower bound on the
standard deviation of power flow fp` . From Lemma 2 we also
know that the sensitivity ∆βi of power flow in line i to load
dpi is upper-bounded by βi, so we have
std[f˜pi ] > σi > ∆
β
i
√
2ln(1.25/δ)/ε.
Since the randomized power flow follow is now given by
a Normal distribution with the standard deviation std[f˜pi ]
as above, by Theorem 1, mechanism M˜ satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy for each grid customer up to adjacency
parameter β.
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